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THE TWILIGHT OF
NONSPEECH
BERNARD E. GEGAN*

I;JJIBELOUS UTTERANCES, not being within the area of constitutionally
Lprotected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State
courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.'" Beauharnais v. Illinois.'
"We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press." Roth v. United States.2
Through these two cases was woven into our law an approach to
freedom of speech that Professor Kalven has called the "two-level"
theory. "There are two categories of speech-that entitled to first amendment scrutiny, although after such scrutiny it may prove subject to regulation; and that so without importance or ideas that it is virtually per se
subject to regulation and raises no constitutional issues.""
Both Beauharnais and Roth rested most heavily on history and
tradition. If libel and obscenity were understood to be subject to regulation at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and thereafter,
then clearly it could not have been intended that they should receive
constitutional protection. Historical practice, however, has a way of
yielding to new doctrine and the technique of carving out categories of
constitutional nonspeech has received heavy blows in recent years. In
the case of libel it has been discarded and in relation to obscenity it
has entered a twilight of decline. It will be the purpose of this article
to examine the influences that led to this state of affairs and look forward
to the probable shape of things to come.

*Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University; B.S., St. John's University;
LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M., Harvard University.
1 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
2 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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Libel: Speech or Nonspeech?
At the time of the Beauharnaiscase the
prevailing standard used to distinguish protected expression from regulable action was
the phrase first used by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States:4 "The question
in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent.", At issue in Beauharnais
was the constitutionality of a so-called
group libel statute which made it a crime
to portray "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens,
of any color, race, creed or religion which
said publication or exhibition exposes the
citizens of any race, color, creed or religion
to contempt, derision or obloquy or which
is productive of breach of the peace or
riots. . . ." Since the reference to breaches
of the peace was in the alternative the state
courts refused to grant Beauharnais' request for a jury instruction in terms of clear
and present danger. It was this feature of
the case that led the Supreme Court to read
libel out of the first amendment. To what
extent the test was inapposite to varying
types of free speech issues or was incomplete in guiding judgment in those cases to
which it logically applied, need not detain
us at this point. The only way the group
libel statute could pass muster was to avoid
the clear and present danger test; and the
only way to avoid the test was to hold the
first amendment inapplicable to libel.

It was unquestionably true that some
kinds of speech were routinely actionable.
The Court had recognized as much in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:6 "There
are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
fighting words."'7 Since insults, lewd and
obscene displays and the like shock and
offend the unwilling listener and libel presently injures reputation, it is unlikely that
the Court in Chaplinsky was indulging in
more than an elliptic affirmation of the
harm-causing capacity of certain speech.
The examples given were instances of palpable clear and present danger, not a list
of exceptions to the test's requirements.8
The Court, however, chose to cast libel,
and by analogy, group libel, beyond the
constitutional pale, where it remained until
retrieved by New York Times v. SullivanW
in 1964.
For all its improvement over prior law
the test concealed unresolved questions. In
the words of a leading scholar:
Even where it is appropriate, the clear
and present danger test is an oversimplified
judgment unless it takes account also of
a number of other factors: the relative
seriousness of the danger in comparison
with the value of the occasion for speech
or political activity; the availability of
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4249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5

Id. at 52.

U.S. 568 (1942).

7 Id. at 571-72.
8 KALVEN, supra note 3, at 48-50.
9376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) upholding statute
prohibiting threats to the President.
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more moderate controls than those the
state has imposed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched. 1°
These complexities were first recognized
by Justice Brandeis in his eloquent dissent
in Whitney v. California:"
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot
justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively
serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it
would be inappropriate as the means for
averting a relatively trivial harm to society.
A police measure may be unconstitutional
merely because the remedy, although effective as a means of protection, is unduly
12
harsh or oppressive.
As fate was to have it, when the Court
finally accepted the Holmes-Brandeis test
and recognized its complexities in the
Smith Act prosecutions of the Communist
leaders' it stood Brandeis' qualification on
its head and used the relative gravity of the
apprehended evil, not as a source of
heightened protection for speech, but as a
substitute for clarity and imminence.
It is against this background that the
New York Times case enters the stream
of first amendment doctrine. There, the
Alabama courts subjected the New York
Times to a large libel judgment based on
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false statements concerning a police commissioner contained in a paid civil rights
advertisement. Drawing inspiration from
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's special
concern for speech in relation to matters
of public policy in a self-governing society, 14 the Court discerned in the historical
rejection of the Alien and Sedition Act of
1798 a "central meaning" of the first
amendment. As the Court said in a later
case involving criminal libel:
For speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our "profound
national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
15
government and public officials.'
The Court accordingly held that defamatory falsehood concerning the official conduct of a public servant could be actionable
only if made with conscious disregard of
the truth. The same rule was later applied
to defamation of private citizens involved
in public issues.'"
If Beauharnaisis used as a starting point
it no doubt seems as though libel has been
catapulted from constitutional oblivion
onto center stage. The surprise ought to
be less if it is remembered that, apart from
the fiat in Beauharnais, libel had never
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been an "exception" to the restraints of
the first amendment. Since libel injures a
valued interest in reputation it clearly
causes a "substantive evil" that the state
has a right to prevent. New York Times
is essentially a fulfillment of Brandeis' insight that not every substantive harm is
grave enough to deserve a remedy at the
expense of discussion. The Court moved
beyond considerations of proximity of danger to the basic position that individual
reputation cannot be preferred to speech
so important to the core purpose of the first
amendment.
It is ironic that when the Court in Dennis
misused Brandeis' reasoning it did so under
the banner of clear and present danger,
whereas, when in New York Times, the
Court gave substance to it, no indebtedness
to the pathbreaking work of Brandeis was
acknowledged. The values of doctrinal continuity would be better served if new rules
could be made to grow naturally out of old
ones rather than abruptly replacing them.
Obscenity in Context
It is commonplace to deplore the lack of
clear purpose behind laws repressing obscenity. The proponents of such legislation
have thus far been spared the hardship of
such analysis because the Supreme Court
has from the beginning relegated obscenity
to the category of nonspeech.17 Although
the Court drew support from history, a
major ground of decision was the total lack
of "redeeming social importance" in obscenity.

1T

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968);

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

In the welter of conflicting views concerning this subject the principal recent
development has been the Court's rulings
that the existence of redeeming social importance in an erotic work could chiefly
depend on factors extrinsic to the work itself. In Ginzburg v. United States' s the
Court held that pandering to the sexual
appetite of potential consumers could be
decisive on the issue of obscenity in doubtful cases. The Court observed of the
defendant's pandering: "The deliberate
representation of petitioncrs' publications
as erotically arousing, for example, stimulated the reader to accept them as prurient;
he looks for titillation, not for saving intellectual content."'' This echoes the Model
Penal Code's theory of the basic offense as
"commercial exploitation of the widespread
2
weakness for titillation by pornography." '0
Finally, the Court concluded that a clear
appeal to this appetite "strengthens the conclusion that the transactions here were sales
of illicit merchandise, not sales of constitutionally protected matter."'"
The emphasis given by the Court to titillation as opposed to free speech shows the
vigor still remaining in the concept of obscenity as nonspeech. At least in the realm
of hard-core pornography there is a realistic
psychological basis for so holding. Pornography is designed to act as a psychological
22
aphrodisiac to stimulate erotic response.

383 U.S. 463 (1966).
"1Id. at 470.
20 Schwartz, Morals Oflenses and the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677
(1963).
21 383 U.S. at 474-75.
22 KRONHAUSEN & KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY
18
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In this sense the use of pornography is an
experience more than a communication, an
activity more than a speech. The experiential quality of pornography is shared by
the company it keeps. Where tolerated,
erotic objects are sold by the same merchants who vend pictorial and written
erotica. They seemingly appeal to overlapping markets and serve the same purposes when used. It is clear that behavior,
not communication, is involved in the use
of such objects to arouse erotic response
through the tactile sense. It is at least
reasonable to assimilate hard-core pornographic stimulation through the visual
sense to the same category. The psychological estimate of hard-core pornography
is complimented by the functional purposes of the first amendment. The political
expression rationale of Professor Meiklejohn 23 has gained recognition through the
"central purpose" of the first amendment
discerned in the New York Times case.
In this light the irrelevance of pornography
to any "governing importance" is as significant as its meretriciousness. In both senses
the Roth criteria of lack of redeeming social
importance has been responsive to the
realities of the problem.

Obscenity and Privacy
The historically safe harbor of obscenity
legislation was penetrated recently in Stanley v. Georgia.2 4 In a virtual reenactment

Clure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5,
62 (1960); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases:
Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7.
23

See Meiklejohn, supra note 14.
U.S. 557 (1969).
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of the facts of Mapp v. Ohio,25 federal and
state agents obtained a warrant to search
Stanley's house for gambling paraphernalia.
In the course of their search the agents
discovered some film in a desk drawer.
When the film proved upon examination to
be obscene, a conclusion not disputed on
appeal, Stanley was convicted in the Georgia courts of knowingly possessing obscene
matter. The Supreme Court bypassed the
clear violation of the Mapp rule against the
use of unconstitutionally seized evidence
and deliberately confronted the issue it had
strenuously avoided in Mapp: whether
mere private possession of obscene matter
could constitutionally be made criminal?
With freedom of speech linked with the
value of privacy, with which it is frequently
in conflict, 6 the conclusion was irresistible:
Stanley's actions were beyond the reach of
the State. It was also inevitable that the
other side of the pandering coin should
turn up. Erotica could be sheltered as well
as rendered vulnerable by the context in
which it appeared.
Specifically joining the rights of freedom
to read and privacy, the Court held: "If the
First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books
27
he may read or what films he may watch.
In shielding private indulgence from the
reach of the law the Court confronted two
possible bases upon which the State could
assert an interest in private reading habits.

25367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
27 394 U.S. at 565.
2See, e.g., Time,
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First, the Court rejected as wholly illegitimate under the philosophy of the first
amendment the suggestion that the State
could maintain a concern for the moral
quality of a man's private thoughts. Second,
the Court laid to rest the traditional strawman of obscenity regulation, the prospect
of antisocial acts resulting from indulgence
in obscenity. The Court first noted the lack
of empirical evidence to support such apprehensions, and, secondly, quoting Justice
Brandeis in Whitney, stated that "[a]mong
free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and
punishment for violations of the law ....
Having thrust aside the two most paternalistic of the possible justifications for
obscenity laws, the Court reaffirmed its
fidelity to the line of cases led by Roth,
and in doing so mentioned some of the
legitimate social interests protected by such
laws. "But that case [Roth] dealt with
public distribution of obscene materials
and such distribution is subject to different
objections. For example, there is always
the danger that obscene material might fall
into the hands of children . . . or that it
might intrude upon the sensibilities or
'29
privacy of the general public.
This catalogue of interests provides much
to think about. First, there is the case of
children. The Court has recently sanctioned
the approach of contextual obscenity laws
specifically limited to minorsA0 Although
the passage from Stanley quoted above
could be read as approving concern for

children as a justification for general obscenity regulation, it is clear that such a
meaning could not have been intended. The
Court long ago ruled that the adult population cannot be reduced to reading only
31
what is fit for children.
The reference in Stanley to intrusion
upon the privacy of the public is amplified
in Redrup v. New York3 2 to mean "an assault upon individual privacy by publication
in a manner so obtrusive as to make it
impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid exposure to it."'33 Unsolicited mailings and indecent public displays are obvious examples. While the public nuisance
type of regulation commends itself to the
sternest critics of obscenity legislation,'3 4 it
has presented difficult problems in the context of political expression. While the public's sensibilities may be protected against
psychic assault, their peace of mind may
not be insulated from shocking ideas. In
Terminiello v. Chicago:15 the Court held
unconstitutional a Chicago ordinance prohibiting speech which "stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance."
In holding the alternative criteria of the
ordinance overbroad, the Court wrote:
[A] function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose

U'1
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1956).

3.2
386 U.S. 767 (1967).
3

34

d. at 769.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-

324 (1968); Henken, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 391 (1963); EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
TION

28 Id. at 566-67.
29
Id.at 567.
30 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

35 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

91

(1967).
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when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects
as it presses for acceptance of an idea.3 6
The principles of Terminiello frequently
come into play in cases of so-called "symbolic speech." If the Court can be persuaded that the restrictive law is directed
at the content of the protest rather than
impartially at its physical manifestations,
the right of free speech will prevail over
7
public distaste for the style of the speaker.1
Thus, in Stromberg v. California,38 a defendant had been convicted of violating a
California statute prohibiting the public
display of a red flag "as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government." In an opinion by Chief Justice
Hughes the Supreme Court held the statute
to be an unconstitutional interference with
the liberty of political expression secured
by the fourteenth amendment. Similarly, the
Court recently upheld the constitutional
right of public high school students to wear
sedate black armbands as an expression of
their opposition to the war in Vietnam."'
On the other hand, as the Court said in
Cantwell v. Connecticut:40
Resort to epithets or personal abuse is

not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the

IId. at 4.
For an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the
Court, see, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
38s283 U.S. 359 (1931).
39
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
37
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Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
41
instrument.
The difficulties are nowhere brought out
more vividly than in the recent flag-burning case. 42 One Street, was convicted of
violating a New York statute prohibiting
public mutilation of the United States flag.
The majority of the Supreme Court found
it unnecessary to reach the ultimate question whether flag burning was a protected
form of speech. They reversed the conviction because, as they viewed the statute,
the information and the evidence, Street
could have been convicted for the words
he spoke at the time he burned the flag and
not just for the flag burning itself. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, White
and Fortas each filed a dissenting opinion.
Each felt compelled to reach the merits of
the flag burning statute and each thought
it constitutional. The Chief Justice went so
far as to express his difficulty in imagining
that the majority would have thought differently had they reached the issue. Only
Justice Fortas wrote at length on the reasons why the statute was constitutional and
he did not emphasize the shock effect of
unwillingly witnessing the burning of the
national emblem. However, the careful attention the majority opinion gave to the
shock effect problem lends support to the
Chief Justice's observation concerning the
entire Court's view of the matter.
The most difficult aspect of the case is
that the distasteful and shocking behavior
of Street could not be said to inhere solely

41Id. at 309-10.
42 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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irrhis conduct independently of his views.
This is fiendishly apparent when it is remembered that burning is the statutory
method of respectful disposal.43 Clearly,
what is controlling in the affront to sensibilities is the intent with which the burning
is done. This is perilously close to suppression of hateful ideas. Yet it stops short of
that. Street was prosecuted not for the
content of his ideas about this country but
for the offensive and provocative manner
in which he expressed them. The psychic
assault was primarily in the medium, not
the message.
If sparing the ragged nerves of passers-by
is the interest secured by the flag-burning
statute then it does not clarify matters to
argue "that loyalty to the flag, like loyalty
to the country, cannot be coerced. '44 The
tranquillity of the unwilling spectator is not
dependent upon the loyalty of the incendiarist. It must finally be admitted that there
is an appealing live-and-let-live quality
about a rule barring compulsory flag salute 45 and a rule preventing public flag
desecration.
The evil identified in Redrup as "pandering" and the interest referred to in Stanley
as the "sensibilities" of the public taken
together express the state interest in the
public morality. As Professor Henken clarified some years ago, the evil actually perceived by the public which enacts obscenity
legislation is infringement on the general

43 36 U.S.C. § 176(j) (1964).
44 Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime,

116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1003 (1968).
45West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v, Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).

moral standard of the community.4 6 It
must be emphasized that this interest is
distinct from the interest in freedom from
unwanted imposition of offensive displays
discussed previously. Here it may be assumed that no one is unwillingly exposed
to an obscene performance or subjected to
an unwelcome display of immodesty. The
interest here is the suppression of public
commercial transactions respecting books
to be taken home and read in private or
performances to be viewed by a willing
audience behind closed doors. Under these
circumstances is there a legitimate interest
in suppressing the commercial solicitation
to acts in contravention of the common
moral code?
There exists a body of opinion that the
state has no business embracing any particular moral position in respect of conduct
which does not directly impinge on the
interests of others. In his stimulating book,
Professor Packer, analyzing the purpose
of the Model Penal Code's prohibition on
commercial dissemination of obscenity,
concludes: "The answer can only be, on
their own assumptions, the repression of
sin.' 47 The Court in Stanley cites a passage
from Professor Henken's article:
Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is wrong
for the individual, and has no place in a
decent society. They believe, too, that
adults as well as children are corruptible
in morals and character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be
eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed
primarily for the protection of others.

46 Henken, supra note 34.
47 PACKER, supra note 34, at 321.
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Much of it is suppressed for the purity of
the community and for the salvation and
welfare of the "consumer." Obscenity, at
48
bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin.

There is much that is true in Professor
Henken's analysis. Yet his use of the word
"sin" to describe society's condemnation of
obscenity (and, presumably, other sexual
derelictions) is surely a verbal gambit
to enlist the tradition of separation of
church and state in support of his position.
Indeed, Professor Henken goes on to suggest hat the legal enforcement of personal
morals might constitute an establishment of
religion.
The root assumption underneath these
positions is the equation of morals and religion, vice and sin. The practice of righteous
behavior as a path to salvation is enjoined
by all the great religions. Yet to simply
equate the two is inadmissible. Sin is an
offense against God for which divine retribution will be exacted. Immorality is a
departure from right reason in behavior
deflecting man from his duty as he sees it
in terms of his own nature and his relations
with others. Whether derived from natural
law, other ethical insights, or just received
tradition, a sense of right and wrong, honor
and baseness has always been part of
human awareness. When the people feel
that homosexuality, bestiality, incest, polygamy and other vice are not tolerable in
whole or in part, they forbid them, not to
propitiate God, but to still their own fears
and suppress passions incompatible with
human dignity, inimical to individual hap-

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

394

U.S. at 565,

1969

piness and, if allowed to flourish, harmful
to valued institutions, e.g., the family.
In these judgments society may be right or
wrong, too strict or too lax, nonfeasant or
paternalistic. Moreover, the interests served
by such laws must also coexist with other
values, such as privacy. The adjustment
between these interests may be the subject
of fruitful debate, as Professor Hart and
Lord Devlin have shown us. 4 . What is
clear, however, is that the existence of
public policy in matters of morals cannot
be dismissed categorically as an ultra
vires exercise in theocracy. The long-settled
constitutional policy against coercion of
religious belief and state support of religious institutions does not apply to society's
repression of morally repellent behavior.
In any event, the Court has shown little
disposition to deal with such issues in terms
of establishment of religion. There does remain to be worked out, however, an accommodation between the claims of private
autonomy and the demands of public morality. Professor Packer, for one, can see
no satisfactory affirmative answer to "the
question whether if, assuming the thing
being exploited commercially should not
itself be suppressed, there is any reason to
suppress its commercial exploitation."50
This misconceives the reasons for which,
according to Stanley, society stays its hand
in the case of private indulgence. It does
not acknowledge a "right" to undergo pornographic experiences in private any more

49P. DEVLIN,

48

SUMMER

THE ENFORCEMENT
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(1968); H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY
RALITY (1963).
50 PACKER, supra note 34, at 321.
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than the statute of frauds grants a "right"
to breach oral contracts. The law tolerates
both because of uniquely remedial considerations. The cure would be worse than
the disease. The recognition of this does
not mean that society either values the
disease or considers it with indifference.
Should the repellent activity surface in
circumstances not relevant to privacy the
law will step in. The privilege recognized
in Stanley is, in short, a shield for the private citizen, not a sword for the purveyor.
Of course, the personal autonomy resulting from the immunity conferred by
Stanley may take on an affirmative life of
its own. Moving beyond a passive right to
be let alone, the private consumer of pornography may lay claim of access to outside
sources of supply without which his antecedent "right" would be hampered in its enjoyment. Courts would then decide whether
the protection of public morality against
commercial dissemination was a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify the
chilling effect thereby thrown upon the right
of private indulgence.
At present, the Court, through its reaffirmation of Roth and reference to the
Model Penal Code, appears content to recognize a valid social interest in stopping
commercial exploitation of the "well-nigh
universal weakness for a look behind the
curtain of modesty." 51 There is a clear
analogy to the Model Code's treatment of
prostitution in which "sexual activity is
penalized only when carried on as a busi''52
ness or for hire.

51 See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 678.
52

Id.

Conclusion
Apart from its significance for obscenity
and the first amendment, Stanley does not
push the frontier of the emerging constitutional right of privacy beyond the boundary
of the landmark decision, Griswold v.
Connecticut.5 3 Of the two, Griswold is
the more difficult case to justify in terms
of the source of constitutional rights and
the Court's role in relation to a written
constitution. In unlocking the coffin of nonspeech in which obscenity had reposed the
Court disinterred a remarkably healthy
corpse. While society may yet prevent it
from stalking about in public, its new
standing as a form of private speech is
firmly grounded in the basic purposes of
the first amendment. In contrast, Griswold's holding that marital privacy required
immunity from anti-contraceptive legislation could draw little comfort from any
right specifically recognized in the Constitution. Justice Douglas' struggle with penumbras, emanations and zones of privacy
scattered through the Bill of Rights was
more ingenious as an effort to avoid the bad
odor of substantive due process than convincing as an affirmative grounding of a
right immanent in the specifics of the Bill
of Rights.
It seems certain that further changes will
flow from the energies released by the
Court's opening of the formerly closed
categories of nonspeech. It is worth noting
that libel and obscenity left the category
in opposite directions. Libel became protected in so far as it is public. Obscenity
acquired protection in so far as it is private.
5"
3381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Professor Kalven, in a landmark discussion, 5 4 saw a repudiation of the doctrine
of seditious libel as the "central meaning"
of the first amendment. The special protection given by the Court to criticism of
public men and public measures underwrites that view. Yet it is difficult to escape
the feeling that an equally central point in
the meaning of the first amendment was
grasped by Justice Marshall in Stanley,

Kalven, The New York Times Case-A Note
on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191.
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when he wrote: "If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch." il5 In the long
story of liberty the securing of a private
citadel of freedom of thought has been no
less important for the soul of man than
the protection of the aggressive spirit of
public controversy has been for the society
of men.

54

55 394 U.S. at 565.

